Tampered Ledger Wallets Found in Berlin as Hardware Wallet Security Takes a Double Hit
Ledger confirmed tampered hardware wallets in Berlin on 18 November 2026, with two more suspected units in Dubai, as the implant scheme behind an estimated $87 million in thefts spreads beyond Southeast Asia. Trezor, meanwhile, disclosed a shipping-partner breach exposing about 27,000 orders.

At a glance: Ledger confirmed on 18 November that tampered hardware wallets have turned up in Berlin, with two more suspected units under investigation in Dubai. It is the same criminal implant operation the company first disclosed in October, and it is no longer confined to Southeast Asia. The devices look genuine, but a hidden modification records the 24-word recovery phrase as the owner types it in during setup. On-chain investigators have linked the scheme to about $87 million in suspected thefts across Bitcoin, Ethereum and Tron. Ledger stresses that its secure chip and software were not hacked: the attack hit the distribution chain after the devices left its control. And Ledger is not the only hardware wallet maker having a bad week. Trezor disclosed that a breach at its shipping partner Skladon exposed order details for about 27,000 customers, and scam calls to those customers have already started.
The Berlin cases change the shape of this story. When Ledger first went public on 15 October, every confirmed case traced back to one reseller, CryptoBilis, and the company described the problem as localised. A month later the geography has widened, and Ledger now says it expects more tampered devices to surface. For anyone who bought a Ledger from a shop or a marketplace seller rather than from Ledger itself, the advice is blunt: stop using the device, move the funds, and do not reuse the old recovery phrase.
What Ledger confirmed in Berlin and Dubai
Ledger confirmed the Berlin cases in an update on its support site on 18 November. A few tampered units were localised to Berlin, and the company is asking anyone who bought a Ledger device there from a third party since January 2026 to contact its support team. In Dubai, it is investigating reports of two tampered units and working with distribution partners to find out how they entered circulation. Those devices were bought at a Virgin Megastore location, according to multiple reports. Ledger also found one affected Ledger Nano Gen5 among the Southeast Asian resellers it paused in October.
The company is careful about what this is, and what it is not. “Our findings since then show tampered devices outside Southeast Asia. It is the same incident,” Ledger said in the update. “There is no flaw in Ledger’s secure chip or operating system, and no confirmed case involving a device bought on ledger.com.” Its Donjon security team is examining the suspected devices, resellers have been asked to pause sales wherever inspections are ongoing, and the company is working with law enforcement and the security community. The total number of affected devices is still described as small, but Ledger expects that count to grow as more units are examined and more reports come in through social media.
How the implant steals a recovery phrase
The attack is physical, not digital, and that is what makes it hard to spot. A criminal group bought genuine Ledger devices, opened them, fitted hidden components, and put them back on sale through resellers. Every device Ledger has confirmed carries the same kind of modification, built to capture the recovery phrase during setup. The 24-word phrase is the master key to a wallet: anyone who holds it can drain the funds, no password or PIN required.
Nothing about the device looks wrong from the outside. The packaging, the device, the setup flow all behave normally, and the theft happens later, silently, when the phrase the owner just created is already in criminal hands. That is why Ledger’s guidance focuses on where the device came from rather than how it behaves. A device bought directly from ledger.com has no confirmed case attached to it. Every confirmed case so far involves a third-party seller.
The $87 million trail
The investigation began last month after customers who bought devices from CryptoBilis reported losses. On-chain investigators traced a suspected drain of about $87 million from hundreds of victim wallets across Ethereum, Tron and Bitcoin. That figure is the investigators’ estimate, not a number Ledger itself has published, and it covers the whole incident rather than the Berlin cases alone. Ledger has not put a total loss figure on the incident and has not addressed compensation.
What the Berlin confirmation does is widen the pool of people who should be checking. The October cases were tied to resellers in seven Asian markets, which Ledger asked to pull devices from sale. Now the same modification has shown up in a European capital and in the Gulf, bought through ordinary retail channels. The criminal group behind it spent months on the operation, according to Ledger’s original disclosure, and the company is treating the distribution chain itself as compromised until proven otherwise.
What to do if you bought a Ledger from a third party
Ledger’s instructions for anyone concerned about a device are specific, and worth following in order. Do not use the device to set up or restore a wallet, and do not open or modify it yourself. Move your funds to a new wallet whose recovery phrase was created on a device bought directly from ledger.com, and do not reuse your current recovery phrase or passphrase, because a tampered device can capture both. Then file a report with your local authorities and contact Ledger Support through an official ticket.
For a limited time, Ledger Support can arrange a physical inspection, including X-ray analysis, at the company’s factory in Vierzon, France. Concerned owners can ship a device there securely for inspection and return. Ledger also repeats a line worth remembering whatever wallet you use: “We will never ask for your recovery phrase.” Neither will Ledger Support, and no legitimate support agent will ever ask you to send a device except through an official support ticket.
Trezor’s bad week: 27,000 orders exposed
While Ledger was confirming its Berlin cases, its biggest rival was dealing with a different kind of supply-chain failure. Trezor disclosed on 16 November that attackers gained unauthorised access to systems run by Skladon, one of its shipping and fulfilment partners, and likely exported data tied to about 27,000 orders placed between 9 August and 7 November 2026. The exposed records include names, delivery addresses, phone numbers, email addresses and purchase details, including the product bought and the price paid.
No wallet backups, PINs or passphrases were involved, and Trezor says its own systems were not compromised. But the data is exactly what a scammer needs to sound convincing: a caller who knows you bought a Trezor Safe 5 in September, and what you paid for it, does not need technical access to anything. Trezor has confirmed that some customers have already received fraudulent calls, and it has warned that the details could be used in calls, texts, emails or letters, and could even pose a risk to customers’ physical security. The company has notified the relevant data protection authority, shortened its order-data retention from 90 days to 45, and launched anonymous pickup in 18 European countries so buyers need not hand over a home address.
It is Trezor’s third third-party security incident in a little over three months, after a breach at logistics partner ShipMonk in August exposed nearly 14,000 customers. The Skladon breach is also separate from a second Trezor problem: implants found in three Trezor Safe 5 devices bought through the same CryptoBilis reseller behind the Ledger cases. Trezor released firmware version 2.13.1 on 11 November to block the recording mechanism those implants used, and buyers of any Trezor model from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onward qualify for replacement assistance. Anyone who already used one of those devices has been told to move funds to a new wallet with a new recovery phrase, because the firmware update cannot protect words captured before it was installed.
The weak point is the supply chain, not the chip
Put the two stories together and the pattern is hard to miss. Neither company says its cryptography failed. Ledger’s chip and operating system are intact, and Trezor’s devices and systems were untouched. What failed, twice over, is everything around the device: the resellers who sell it, the warehouses that ship it, and the order records that follow it. Hardware wallets were designed to take the keys away from exposed computers. The last month has shown that the journey from factory to front door deserves the same scrutiny as the device itself.
The irony is that self-custody keeps growing. Toss just launched a non-custodial crypto wallet for 30 million users in Korea, and institutions keep leaning on specialists: Bitwise’s new spot Zcash ETF filing puts Coinbase Custody in charge of holding the coins. The Berlin cases also arrive as Germany tightens its grip on crypto with a new seizure bill. None of that changes the practical lesson of this week, which is simple and cheap to follow: buy a hardware wallet only from the manufacturer, check it before you trust it with funds, and treat any call, text or email that knows too much about your purchase as a scam until proven otherwise.
What to watch
- More devices: whether Ledger confirms further tampered units outside Berlin and Dubai, and whether any surface in other European markets.
- The Dubai trail: what Ledger’s distribution partners find about how the two suspected units entered circulation through retail.
- Law enforcement: whether the investigation produces arrests or a public account of the group behind the CryptoBilis operation.
- Trezor’s follow-up: whether the Skladon investigation revises the 27,000-order figure, and whether scam reports from affected customers keep coming.
- Reseller rules: whether Ledger and Trezor tighten authorised-reseller requirements further, and whether other wallet makers audit their own distribution chains.
How can I tell if my Ledger wallet has been tampered with?
You usually cannot tell from the outside: the devices look genuine and behave normally during setup. The hidden modification records the recovery phrase as you type it in. If you bought a Ledger from a third-party seller in Southeast Asia, Berlin (since January 2026) or Dubai and have any concern, stop using it, do not set up or restore a wallet on it, and contact Ledger Support. For a limited time Ledger offers free physical inspections, including X-ray analysis, at its factory in Vierzon, France.
Was Ledger hacked?
No. Ledger says there is no flaw in its secure chip or operating system, and no confirmed case involves a device bought on ledger.com. A criminal group bought genuine devices, fitted them with hidden components after they left Ledger’s control, and sold them through resellers. The attack targeted the distribution channel, not Ledger’s technology.
What should I do if I bought a Ledger in Berlin or Dubai?
Ledger asks anyone who bought a Ledger device in Berlin since January 2026, or in Dubai, to contact its support team. Do not use the device to set up or restore a wallet. Move your funds to a new wallet whose recovery phrase was created on a device bought directly from ledger.com, do not reuse your old recovery phrase or passphrase, and file a report with your local authorities.
What happened in the Trezor Skladon breach?
Attackers accessed systems run by Trezor’s shipping partner Skladon on 7 November 2026 and likely exported data tied to about 27,000 orders placed between 9 August and 7 November, including names, addresses, phone numbers, emails and purchase details. No wallet backups, PINs or passphrases were exposed, but Trezor confirmed some customers have already received scam calls using the stolen details.


